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I. INTRODUCTION 
Card tables, slot machines, the massive bar with live music, the cashier, 
all the sounds and lights.  This is typical of the interior layout of a classic 
casino, but doesn’t it seem like all casinos are the same?  Don’t all casinos 
have to be different, otherwise it would be unfair and against the law to 
“copy” something from another . . . right?!  Casino equipment, such as slot 
machines and card games, cannot be copied from its creator unless it is fair 
to use the product.  At the same time, casinos seem so similar to one 
another.  In order to have a unique casino, there must be protection of 
original and innovative casino games and machines for the creators and 
owners.  The only way to achieve this originality in gambling equipment 
and innovations is by implementing proper law as guidance for casinos to 
follow and abide by. 
This article examines what it should take for casino games and 
machines to be protected by the doctrine of fair use and how this defense 
might be altered to potentially allow more protection for creators/inventors 
of casino games and machines.  The background of this article defines the 
aspects to the doctrine of fair use and copyright infringement.  The analysis 
discusses how to obtain the defense of “fair use” when one casino uses the 
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same gambling game and/or machine as another casino.  The proposal 
discusses possible alternatives and solutions to help copyrighted gambling 
games and machines become distinct in certain casinos.  In order to give 
each casino a special appeal with copyrighted gambling games and 
machines, there needs to be a protection from one another to minimize, and 
hopefully eliminate, the copying of gambling ideas and concepts by 
creating more rigid elements to the doctrine of fair use, with the goal that 
this defense cannot be used so “easily.”  Finally, the conclusion suggests 
possible solutions on how to protect gambling games and machines in one 
casino from being wrongfully copied by other casinos.  These suggestions 
are merely guidelines to follow if the gaming industry ever wanted to 
explore the idea of protection for specific casino games and machines. 
Overall, this article examines what it takes to be considered “fair use” 
when it comes to casinos’ intellectual property for gambling games and 
machines.  Without the doctrine of fair use, no two casinos would be able to 
have the same technology, machinery, and overall interior.  “In most betting 
shops you will see three windows marked ‘Bet Here,’ but only one window 
with the legend ‘Pay Out,’”1 and the only way each casino can have that 
very same setting is through fair use.  Original casino games and machines, 
however, should be allowed to exist freely, if desired by the 
creator/inventor, without the concern of copying by other casinos. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section discusses the elements of copyright infringement and the 
four factors of the doctrine of fair use.  An in-depth explanation is given for 
each fair use factor and how that particular part pertains to copyright 
infringement. 
A. HIT OR BUST—JUST BORROWING OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
To examine casino technology, such as card games and slot machines, 
in the context of the doctrine of fair use, one must first understand what 
some of the terms mean.  In order to argue whether the defense of fair use is 
relevant for gambling technology, a casino must first prove it has something 
worthy of protection.2  Violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copy-
 
1. Jeffrey Bernard, Quotations about Gambling, QUOTE GARDEN, http://www.quotegarden. 
com/gambling.html (last modified Sept. 9, 2010). 
2. Michael J. Thompson, Give Me $25 on Red and Derek Jeter for $26:  Do Fantasy Sports 
Leagues Constitute Gambling?, 8 SPORTS LAW J. 21, 42 (2001). 
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right owner constitutes infringement.3  These exclusive rights include the 
right to reproduce the work, the right to prepare derivative works based on 
the work, the right to distribute copies of the work to the public, and the 
right to display the work publicly.4  Thus, some “exclusive rights” relating 
to casinos can pertain to items such as card shufflers, slot machines, and 
unique poker games, just to name a few. 
To establish copyright infringement, a party must show he or she had 
valid ownership of a copyright for his or her original work and the 
constituent elements of the work that are original were copied by another 
party.5  Furthermore, a plaintiff with a valid copyright must demonstrate the 
defendant has actually copied the plaintiff’s work and the copying is illegal 
because a substantial similarity exists between the defendant’s work and the 
plaintiff’s protectable elements.6  In addition to these elements, a party must 
demonstrate the defendant’s copying of protected elements of the original 
copyrighted work occurred for his or her use.7  Each element, along with a 
brief history of copyright law, is set forth below. 
1. Copyright Protection 
The United States Constitution grants copyright protection.8  The 
Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and 
[i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and 
[d]iscoveries . . . .”9  The primary purpose of copyright law is “to secure 
‘the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors,’”10 
while its secondary purpose may motivate authors and inventors by giving 
 
3. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006). 
4. Id. § 106(1)-(3), (5). 
5. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 810 (11th 
Cir. 1985). 
6. Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1994). 
7. See Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th 
Cir. 1997). 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Mary B. Percifull, Note, Digital Sampling:  Creative or Just 
Plain “Cheez-Oid?”, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1992). 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.02 (2007) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (citing U.S. CONST., 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18, the Necessary and Proper Clause, to show that the Copyright Clause could have 
been created at a later time for copyrights and patents); Percifull, supra note 8, at 1270; John 
Schietinger, Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films:  How the Sixth Circuit Missed a 
Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 216 (2005). 
10. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, § 1.03[A] (quoting New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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them a reward.11  The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first federal copyright 
act instituted in the United States.12  Today, the Copyright Act of 1976 is 
the most recent enactment by Congress.13  The Copyright Act gives legal 
protection to the authors of original works that are “fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.”14  Furthermore, the Copyright Act preempts state 
law and any conflicting state law is considered invalid.15 
2. Original Ownership 
To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to a 
party.16  Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work 
was independently created and that it possesses at least some minimal 
degree of creativity.17  To be original, the requisite level of creativity is 
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice, no matter how crude, 
humble, or obvious it might be.18  A work may be original even though it 
closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the 
result of copying.19  However, copyright law protects an author’s or artist’s 
 
11. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (discussing how the Copyright Clause encourages individuals by 
rewarding them through economic personal gain, which then advances the public welfare); Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the Copyright Act’s purpose is to 
promote creativity, which will in turn benefit the artist and the public); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991) (holding “sweat of the brow” from one’s 
labor does not provide copyright protection); Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes:  
How Digital Sampling Infringement Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright 
Law and the Need for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 521 (2006) (discussing how 
Congress enacted the Copyright Amendment to promote creativity and reward artists for their 
labor by granting them copyright ownership); Percifull, supra note 8, at 1270 (discussing how the 
primary benefit of a copyright owner obtaining a copyright are for economic reasons because 
artists are granted a limited monopoly for their work, which leads to artists continuing their 
creativity to create a public good); Schietinger, supra note 9, at 216 (discussing how the two main 
purposes of copyright law are to encourage people to create art for society and to protect the 
artist’s work from theft). 
12. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, app. 7-41. 
13. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006); see Percifull, supra note 8, at 1271. 
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  Congress enacted the first copyright act in 1790, which merely 
granted protection to authors of maps, charts, and books for fourteen years. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:19 (2008) [hereinafter PATRY ON COPYRIGHT].  The next copyright act 
was in 1909.  Id. § 1.20. 
15. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (“On and after January 1, 1978 . . . no person is entitled to any such 
right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.”); see 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 14, § 1:82 (discussing how preemption of state law is one of 
the most important aspects in the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976); see also Schietinger, 
supra note 9, at 216. 
16. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 346. 
17. Id.; Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1995). 
18. Feist Publ’ns Inc., 499 U.S. at 346. 
19. Id. 
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original expression; facts and ideas within a work are not protected.20  For a 
casino, it must demonstrate that its technology is new and inventive, thus 
giving it protection from copying by other parties in the industry. 
3. Copying Occurred 
Absent copying, there can be no infringement of copyright.21  Copying 
may be inferred where the alleged infringing party had access to the 
copyrighted work and the accused work is substantially similar to the 
copyrighted work.22  Hence, for a casino to get protections for its products, 
the casino needs to show its industry technology is both original and the 
original item was copied.23  But even if this protection can be granted, 
infringement of the protected item can still be reproduced in a similar 
fashion due to the doctrine of fair use.24 
Copying can be illustrated by either direct or indirect proof.25  Direct 
proof is evidenced by the defendant admitting to copying the work or 
through eyewitness testimony that the defendant copied the work.26  Direct 
admission is not common in copyright infringement cases; the plaintiff 
usually must show indirect proof.27  Indirect proof of copying is shown 
through circumstantial evidence that the defendant had access to the 
plaintiff’s work,28 the work was widely disseminated,29 or there is a 
sufficient similarity between the two works.30  Access to the plaintiff’s 
 
20. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990). 
21. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). 
22. Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chi., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 838, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
23. Id. at 860. 
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing a defense for an alleged infringer). 
25. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (stating that copying can be found 
by the defendant admitting to copying or circumstantial evidence); Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. 
Supp. 282, 289 (D.N.J. 1993); Ponte, supra note 11, at 526; Percifull, supra note 8, at 1272; 
Schietinger, supra note 9, at 218; see Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc.v. Profile Records, Inc., 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1398, 1401 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
26. Ponte, supra note 11, at 526-27; Percifull, supra note 8, at 1273; Schietinger, supra note 
9, at 217; see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating the 
defendant conceded that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement); Williams v. 
Broadus, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (revealing defendants admitted to using part 
of the plaintiffs’ song); Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 
182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (providing an example of how courts have found direct admission of 
unauthorized copying). 
27. Schietinger, supra note 9, at 218. 
28. Id.; see Percifull, supra note 8, at 1273. 
29. Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402 (discussing how access may also be 
found through a particular chain of events where the defendant came across the plaintiff’s work); 
see Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997); Bright Tunes 
Music v. Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 179 (S.D.N.Y 1976). 
30. Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402. 
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work may involve proving the defendant viewed the work or had 
knowledge of the work.31  If evidence of access and similarities exist 
between the two works, then it may be enough for a court or jury to find 
there was copying.32 
4. Misappropriation 
The third and final element of copyright infringement is unlawful 
appropriation or misappropriation.33  Misappropriation is shown by estab-
lishing substantial similarity between the two works.34  There are several 
tests used among the circuit courts to establish substantial similarity, which 
include, but are not limited to, the average lay observer test,35 the 
recognizeability test,36 and fragmented literal similarity.37  Unlawful 
appropriation lies at the heart of proving copyright infringement.38 
In order to prove unlawful appropriation, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
the use of his work by the defendant was substantial and material.39  In 
order to determine whether there is unlawful use of the plaintiff’s work, 
courts typically utilize the “substantial similarity” standard.40  Under the 
 
31. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing how, if the plaintiff 
presents evidence of striking similarity between the two works, it is presumed that there was 
copying); Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402 (citing Favia v. Lyons P’ship, 1996 
WL 194306, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), “[a]s proof of access, a plaintiff may show that ‘(1) the 
infringed work has been widely disseminated or (2) a particular chain of events exists by which 
the defendant might have gained access to work’”); Schietinger, supra note 9, at 218. 
32. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1401. 
33. See Williams v. Broadus, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1051, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Tuff ‘N’ Rumble 
Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402. 
34. Williams, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053; Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402; 
see Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Bright Tunes Music v. 
Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding unconscious 
misappropriation). 
35. See Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402 (stating the test for the Second 
Circuit). 
36. Percifull, supra note 8, at 1276. 
37. Id. 
38. Ponte, supra note 11, at 527; see Percifull, supra note 8, at 1274; Schietinger, supra note 
9, at 217. 
39. Newton, 349 F.3d at 594 (discussing that there will be no legal consequences for copying 
unless the copying is substantial); Percifull, supra note 12, at 1274; see also Williams, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053; Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402. 
40. Percifull, supra note 8, at 1274 (discussing how the substantial similarity test is vague 
and presents a difficult question in copyright law); see Newton, 349 F.3d at 594-95; Ponte, supra 
note 11, at 528-29 (discussing how substantial similarity examines the total concept and feel of 
disputed works).  But see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 
2004) (holding that use of the substantial similarity test was not required since the owner of the 
sound recording had the exclusive right to sample his own recording). 
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substantial similarity standard, courts will determine whether the 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s original work is reasonably recognizable 
to a lay listener in the defendant’s work.41  If it is found that the copying is 
substantial and material, the defendant’s work may infringe.42  If the 
defendant’s work is not found to be “substantial and material” under the 
substantial similarity standard, then the defendant’s use is de minimis.43  
When the defendant’s work is de minimis, it means the copied portion of 
the original work is too small and immaterial.44  However, de minimis use is 
only one way to avoid copyright infringement.  The most popular way to 
avoid copyright infringement is the fair use exception. 
B.  ALL IN—THE FAIR USE BREAKDOWN 
To examine the doctrine of fair use as related to casino technology, one 
must first understand its definition.  The doctrine of fair use permits other 
people to use copyrighted material,45 without the owner’s consent, in a 
reasonable manner for certain purposes.46  The doctrine is important 
because it helps to determine if a copied work is created legally.47 
 
41. Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402; see Newton, 349 F.3d at 594 (citing 
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Williams, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053; 
Ponte, supra note 11, at 528; Percifull, supra note 8, at 1274; Schietinger, supra note 9, at 219 
(referring to the average listener test instead as the “ordinary observer test”). 
42. Ponte, supra note 11, at 528; see Newton, 349 F.3d at 594. 
43. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (defining de 
minimis as a “technical violation of a right so trivial that the law will not impose legal 
consequences”); Schietinger, supra note 9, at 219-20 (stating that de minimis is “copying so trivial 
that it does not gain copyright protection”); see Newton, 349 F.3d at 594-95 (discussing how the 
legal term, de minimis non curat lex means that “the law does not concern itself with trifles”); 
Bridgeport Music, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841, rev’d 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004); see also 
Ponte, supra note 11, at 528. 
44. See Percifull, supra note 8, at 1281. 
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (explaining fair use is a defense to copyright infringement); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (stating violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner 
constitutes copyright infringement); cf. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 449 (2d ed. 1987) (1966) (defining “copyright” as “the exclusive right to make copies, 
license, and otherwise exploit a literary, musical, or artistic work”). 
46. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (holding respondents’ 
unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure’s unpublished manuscript was not sanctioned 
by the Copyright Act’s doctrine of fair use); Tiffany Design v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. 
Supp. 2d 1113, 1123 (D. Nev. 1999) (holding copyright protection gives an exclusive right to 
reproduce copyrighted works); see also HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND 
LITERARY PROPERTY § 125, at 260 (1944) (“[T]he author’s consent to a reasonable use of his 
copyrighted works [had] always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the 
constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts . . . .”). 
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing the four factors for determining whether use of a work 
constitutes fair use). 
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With extensive copying or paraphrasing of the original work or 
physically appropriating the original research, use of copyrighted material 
without the owner’s consent generally will not be considered reasonable.48  
Under the Copyright Act,49 fair use prevents copyright owners from 
restricting distribution of their copyrighted works to the public.50  
Determination of fair use hinges upon the consideration of the following 
four factors:51  (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work, (3) the amount copied in relation to the work as a whole, 
 
48. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. 
Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding a narrow interpretation of fair 
use, with regard to insubstantial copying, does not constitute copyright infringement); Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding 
noncommercial home-use recording of broadcast material does not constitute copyright 
infringement); see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating 
“[b]y copying [plaintiff’s] images in their entirety, defendants took more than was necessary to 
place firmly in the reader’s mind the parodied work and these specific attributes that [were] to be 
satirized” and held “[b]ecause the amount of defendants’ copying exceeded permissible levels, 
summary judgment was proper” as to the copyright infringement claims). 
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
50. Id. (stating fair use of a work including commentary, news reporting, criticism, or other 
uses does not constitute copyright infringement). 
51. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003); Percifull, supra note 8, at 
1278; Schietinger, supra note 9, at 220. 
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and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market.52  These factors, 
however, are not exhaustive in determining fair use.53 
The fair use exception is a defense to copyright infringement.54  The 
doctrine of fair use provides that the use or reproduction of a copyrighted 
work is “not an infringement of copyright” if it is used “by reproduction in 
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”55  One of the 
first significant copyright infringement cases in the United States was 
Folsom v. Marsh56 in 1841.57  In Folsom, the Circuit Court of 
Massachusetts held a concern of copyright infringement is “the degree 
[that] the [defendant’s] use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, 
 
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4); On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173-75 (2d Cir. 2001); 
MCA Inc., 677 F.2d at 182-83  (determining that defendants plagiarized plaintiff's copyrighted 
song, substituted their own lyrics, and performed it for commercial gain, thus defendants did not 
make fair use of plaintiff's song); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(applying the four factors to an investigation of copyright infringement involving The Implosion 
Conspiracy, a book about the Rosenberg trial); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Speciality, 
Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1123-24 (D. Nev. 1999) (applying the four factors to determine whether 
a computerized precursor image of Law Vegas constituted infringement); Storm Impact, Inc. v. 
Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787-90 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying the four 
factors to a fair use inquiry regarding software and shareware); Dr. Seuss Enters., Ltd. P’ship v. 
Penguin Book USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1566 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (applying the four factors to a 
copyright infringement inquiry concerning mimicked Dr. Seuss’ style of O.J. Simpson trial); Horn 
Abbot, Ltd. v. Sarsaparilla, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 360, 367 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (applying four factors in 
an inquiry revolving around the game “Trivial Pursuit”); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. 
Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (applying the four 
factors to a claim alleging infringement of Gone With the Wind); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward 
a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111-25(1990) (commenting on how the more 
copyrighted matter is at the center of the protected concerns of the copyright law, the more the 
other factors, including justification, must favor the secondary user in order to earn a fair use 
finding); Matt Williams, Recent Second Circuit Opinions Indicate That Google’s Library Project 
is Not Transformative, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 311-12 (2007) (elaborating on how 
Google and its proponents may still convince judges in the Second Circuit that the doctrine of fair 
use should protect its Library Project as an innovative technological use of copyrighted material 
that will increase public access to information and creative expression); Percifull, supra note 8, at 
1278; Schietinger, supra note 9, at 220. 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985) (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”). 
54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-07; see Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817. 
55. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002); Storm 
Impact Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 787; see Percifull, supra note 8, at 1278 (discussing how Congress’s 
use of the words “such as” provides that the statute only has a list of examples and there may be 
other permitted purposes that later come to light). 
56. 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. Oct. 1841). 
57. This case dealt with whether the use of letters written by President Washington 
constituted piracy.  Id. at 345.  Three hundred fifty-three out of 866 pages of the defendant’s book 
were identical to the plaintiff’s book.  Id.  Plaintiff acquired an interest in President Washington’s 
letters, and the court held the plaintiff owned these letters along with the exclusive copyright, 
which was infringed upon by the defendant.  Id. at 345-46. 
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or supersede the objects, of the [plaintiff’s] original work.”58  Folsom also 
held copyright infringement is found by “look[ing] to the nature and objects 
of the selections made, [along with] the quantity and value of the materials 
used.”59  Later, the Folsom holding was codified in the Copyright Act of 
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107.60  Today, § 107 is known as the doctrine of fair 
use.61 
The doctrine of fair use will only be applied after the court has found 
copyright infringement.62  The de minimis defense, on the other hand, is 
applied at the time of examining whether copyright infringement has taken 
place.  Therefore, the de minimis analysis used in an infringement case is 
separate from the fair use exception because de minimis use is found when 
substantial similarity has not been met.63 
The equitable doctrine of fair use permits others to use copyrighted 
material without the owner’s consent in a reasonable manner for certain 
purposes.64  Section 107 provides an illustrative, but not exhaustive, list of 
factors for determining when a use is “fair.”65  Each is considered below. 
1. Purpose and Character 
When it comes to the defense of fair use with regard to the “purpose 
and character” of the copying, a court should examine (1) the degree to 
which the challenged use has transformed the original and (2) the profit or 
nonprofit character of the use.66  In other words, the factor entails whether 
 
58. Id. at 348. 
59. Id. 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Percifull, supra note 8, at 1278. 
61. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
62. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding hip-hop group 2 
Live Crew’s song “Pretty Woman” was a parody that did not infringe upon the copyright of Roy 
Orbison’s song, “Oh Pretty Woman” according to the doctrine of fair use); Kelly v. Soft Corp., 
336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing how fair use is an exception to copyright 
infringement and later holding the defendant’s use was fair); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding the works were substantially similar, but they did not infringe because the 
work was found to be a parody under the doctrine of fair use); Schietinger, supra note 13, at 220; 
see Ponte, supra note 11, at 528 (discussing how instances of parodies in disputes have brought 
out the “fair use” defense). 
63. Schietinger, supra note 9, at 220; see, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 
126 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1997) (showing once the de minimis threshold has been crossed, then a 
defendant’s next possible defense is fair use). 
64. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that under § 107, the fair use of a copyrighted work is not 
copyright infringement, even if such use technically violates § 106). 
65. Id. 
66. Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787-88 (N.D. Ill. 
1998). 
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and to what extent the new work is transformative and if the transformed 
work is used for commercial value.67 
a. Commercial Value 
The doctrine of fair use uses the “purpose and character” factor to ask 
whether the original was copied in good faith to benefit the public, or 
primarily for the commercial interests of the infringer.68  Therefore, in 
determining whether fair use exists, the question is whether the alleged 
infringer’s use of the owner’s works is of a commercial nature, or a 
nonprofit educational purpose.69  In a fair use analysis, the critical question 
is “whether [the alleged party] stands to profit from exploitation of the 
[protected work].”70 
Copies made for commercial or profit-making purposes are 
presumptively unfair.71  In fair use analysis, the “crux of the profit/nonprofit 
distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but 
whether the [alleged infringer] stands to profit from exploitation of the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”72  Thus, an 
alleged infringer cannot profit from exploitation of another’s copyrighted 
material without paying a customary price for it, regardless of claims that 
there was no harm because there was no market for the original.73  
Knowingly exploiting copyrighted work(s) “for personal gain militates 
against a finding of fair use.”74  While commercial motivation and fair use 
can exist side-by-side, one may consider whether the alleged infringing use 
was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial gain.75  To 
 
67. Id. at 788. 
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating fair use does not make light of the importance of 
commercial value); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that copies of a 
sculpture created from a copyrighted photograph was made primarily for commercial benefit). 
69. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001). 
70. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
71. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 (1984). 
72. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 562; On Davis, 246 F.3d at 167 (noting the 
court must compare actual profits gained from infringement with potential profits defendant could 
have made if he or she did not infringe); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309 (stating “[k]nowing exploitation 
of a copyrighted work for personal gain militates against a finding of fair use”). 
73. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309, 312. 
74. Id. at 309. 
75. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding substantial 
similarity and the four fair use factors ruled in favor of copyright infringement); Meeropol v. 
Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding the defendant’s book might have been 
published for commercial gain); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 
307-09 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding information used in a biography of Howard Hughes constituted a 
fair use as it served a public interest), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Schuchart & Assocs., 
Prof’l Eng’rs, Inc. v. Solo Serv. Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. 170, 181 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (finding 
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counter a showing of commercial motivation, parties who make a profit 
from copying original work have the burden to show their conduct falls 
within fair use.76 
b. Transformative Work 
A stronger consideration for determining a work’s nature and purpose 
is whether the accused, challenged work has transformed the original into 
something new.77  A transformative work supersedes the original creations, 
adds a different character, or adds something new to further the purpose, all 
while altering the first work with new expression, meaning, or message.78  
Such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair 
use.79 
 
defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ drawings was for commercial purposes, not for educational or non-
profit use); Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 215 U.S.P.Q. 861, 862 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(holding a book giving instructions on how to win a video game was strictly commercial and non-
educational, and as such, not protected by the doctrine of fair use); Marvin Worth Prods. v. 
Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (finding distribution of the film at 
issue did not appear to serve the public interest). 
76. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996). 
77. Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 788 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors 
which may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
78. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-81 (1994) (holding that a 
parody’s commercial character is only one element to consider for fair use, but that element alone 
does not determine whether a parody is fair use); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256, 259 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (affirming there is no infringement where an appropriation of the copyrighted material 
is “transformative” because there is neither commercial exploitation nor bad faith analysis of 
transformation of an original creation).  For example, in Blanch, Koons intended his appropriation 
of the photograph to be “transformative” because the exhibition of the painting could not fairly be 
described as commercial exploitation and there was a lack of bad faith.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 256.  
Koons altered the borrowed work “with new expression, meaning, or message” by completely 
inverting the legs orientation, painting them to surreally dangle or float over the other elements of 
the painting.  Id. at 256, 248.  Koons also changed the coloring and added a heel to one of the feet, 
which had been completely obscured in the original photograph.  Id. at 248; see also On Davis v. 
Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001). 
“If the goal is to move the focus in the transformativeness inquiry from author to reader and 
then to determine how those readers interpret the works at issue—whether a discursive community 
has been created around a work—what evidence might courts consider?”  Laura Heymann, 
Everything Is Transformative:  Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 456 
(2008).  “[T]he better test of whether a second work has contributed a ‘new expression, meaning, 
or message’ to the first is to turn to the reader, the one who ‘holds together in a single field all the 
traces by which the written text is constituted.’”  Id. at 448.  Thus, the best way to determine 
whether the new work is “transformative” would be to examine evidence from the viewpoint of 
the reader.  Id. at 447-51; see also Williams, supra note 52, at 314 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s articulation of the transformative standard). 
79. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 455 n.40 (1984) (“assum[ing] that the category of ‘fair use’ is rigidly circumscribed by a 
requirement that every such use must be ‘productive’”); Williams, supra note 52, at 318-19. 
          
312 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:299 
 
Indeed, “the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is 
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”80  Works that 
merely copy the original are more likely to be copyright infringement.81 
There must be an alteration or change of the original works into something 
new and creative.82  Otherwise, the use of the original work is unfair 
because a transformative expression was not constructed.83 
Transformation is a key ingredient to fair use.84  Consequently, the 
definition of a transformative inquiry can be expanded in four ways: (1) 
defining transformative purpose beyond examples to include creative 
works; (2) considering a secondary work’s expressive purpose, not just its 
functional purpose; (3) considering minimal aesthetic changes as sufficient 
for transformation; and (4) deemphasizing any market harm once trans-
formation is found.85  Basically, transforming a work means to give it a 
different meaning than the original intended. 
2. Nature of Copyrighted Work 
The second fair use factor deals with the intention of the alleged 
infringer when comparing the “copied” work to the original work.  
According to the Copyright Act, there is analysis that requires one to 
 
80. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Heymann, supra note 78, at 451, 466. 
81. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. However, “the more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of 
fair use.”  Id. 
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
83. See id. “[N]o copier may defend the act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the 
copy he has not pirated.”  Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936)).  “[W]here substantial similarity is 
found [between works of different makers], small changes here and there made by the copier are 
unavailing.”  Id. 
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (relating to factor #1). 
85. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251-53 (2d Cir. 2006).  By recontextualizing the 
image, Koons altered and “transformed” Blanch’s photograph in an attempt to force viewers to see 
the original work and its significance differently.  Id. at 251.  Koons was using Blanch’s image as 
fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media, rather than for 
purposes of making money.  Id. at 253; accord Roxana Badin, An Appropriate(d) Place in 
Transformative Value:  Appropriation Art’s Exclusion From Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
60 BROOK. L. REV. 1653, 1660 (1995) (stating an artist may not assert a “fair use” defense to 
protect the work as publicly useful communication and criticism once the piece fails to meet the 
definition of a parody); see also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 
607 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding the defendants’ complete reproduction of seven of the plaintiff’s 
graphic images in a biographical book constituted fair use because all seven images were 
transformative in reduced size, text and placement); Jeannine M. Marques, Fair Use in the 21st 
Century:  Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 331, 333-34 (2007) 
(noting the general disagreement over which factor should weigh more heavily in the fair use 
analysis—the transformative or productive nature of the secondary use or the economic effects on 
a copyright holder—while focusing on expanding the definition of transformative in four ways). 
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examine “the nature of the copyrighted work”86 through recognition “that 
some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than 
others.”87  Where the original work is fictional rather than factual, the scope 
of fair use is broader,88 meaning original, creative works have broader 
copyright protection compared to factual works that have limited 
protection.  Indeed, “a use is less likely to be deemed fair when the copy-
righted work is a creative product.”89 
By copying original and unique works, the very nature of the work is 
being taken away for the protected owner.  Essentially, the work being used 
is at the core of intended copyright protection.90  Therefore, the defense of 
fair use is difficult to establish and should not be applied when creative 
works are copied.91 
3. Amount Copied 
The third factor of fair use looks at the amount substantiality copied 
from the original.92  In general, this means the less of the original work that 
is copied, the more likely the use will be fair.93  The factor can be taken as a 
quantitative analysis.94  An impermissible level of copying may occur when 
the original is copied more than necessary.95  Additionally, this factor is 
interpreted to allow fragmentary copying, which is more likely to have a 
transformative purpose (positive fair use factor), than wholesale copying 
(copyright infringement).96 
 
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (stating the nature of the copyrighted work). 
87. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)) (stating “plaintiff’s copyrighted work [was] in the 
nature of an artistic creation that falls close to the core of the copyright’s protective purposes”); 
see also Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
88. New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp.,  729 F. Supp. 992, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
89. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990) (claiming fair use is more likely to be 
found in factual works than in fictional works). 
90. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
91. Id. 
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006). 
93. Leval, supra note 52, at 1122. 
94. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Pub. Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating 
the third factor has a quantitative component). 
95. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992); see New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 904 F.2d 
at 158 (discussing that courts have found use was not fair where the quoted material formed a 
substantial percentage of the copyrighted work); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 
(2d Cir.), reh’g denied, 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). 
96. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (stating the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310-11 (stating that where the amount of 
copying exceeds permissible levels, summary judgment has been upheld for copyright 
infringement because there was no fair use); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 
(9th Cir. 1978) (upholding summary judgment motion because defendant copied more than was 
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Where the amount of copying exceeds permissible levels, summary 
judgment has been upheld for copyright infringement because there was no 
fair use.97  It is not fair use when more of the original is copied than 
necessary.98  However, one should not look solely at the quantitative aspect 
of copying; a qualitative analysis must also take place.99  The qualitative 
degree of the copying is the degree of the essence of the original that is 
copied in relation to its whole.100  There is not a single authority which can 
lend any support to the proposition wholesale copying and publication of 
copyrighted material can ever be fair use.101  The key issue is the amount of 
the infringing work that is copied verbatim from the copyrighted work.102  
Essentially, this third factor examines whether the “heart” of the original 
work was taken.103 
4. Effect on Potential Market 
Finally, there is one more statutory factor to consider with fair use.104  
The fourth factor examines the market harm caused by the alleged 
infringer’s copying.105  One should measure harm by analyzing whether the 
 
necessary to produce parody of original work); Leon v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 
(9th Cir. 1937) (stating the infringer’s counsel was unable to disclose a single authority, nor was 
the copyright owner’s counsel able to find one, which lent any support to the proposition that 
wholesale copying and publication of copyrighted material can ever be fair use); Tiffany Design, 
Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1124 (D. Nev. 1999) (holding defendant 
did not present triable issue of fact as to third factor because defendant admitted he had scanned 
all or most of original work); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 447-
48 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding the plaintiff did not demonstrate a claim for copyright infringement 
because the defendant established “fair use” defense due to the fact that the defendant’s 
commercial did not borrow an impermissible amount of plaintiff’s commercial). 
97. Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 758. 
98. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98-99. 
99. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1999). 
100. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98–99 (stating the degree can also reveal 
the amount of transformative character and purpose); see New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 904 F.2d at 159 
(analyzing the quotations in the book’s text, which amount to the bulk of the allegedly infringing 
passages, do not take essentially the heart of the original works). 
101. Leon, 91 F.2d at 486. 
102. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 9, § 13.03[A]. 
103. Dr. Seuss Enters., Ltd. P’ship v. Penguin Book USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1567 
(S.D. Cal. 1996); see Jonathan Fox, The Fair Use Commercial Parody Defense and How to 
Improve It, 46 IDEA 619, 627 (2006) (expanding a stark difference between the classic literary 
definition of parody and the legal definition of parody, with significant help from such cases as 
Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc. and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.). 
104. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(mandating the court to consider four enumerated factors when determining if a use is fair). 
105. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (stating the court shall consider the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the 
Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 789 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (claiming the fourth fair use factor 
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infringer’s work usurps or softens the market demand of the original.106  
However, suppressing market value is allowed.107  Fair use, therefore, is 
limited to an author’s work, “which does not materially impair the 
marketability of the work which is copied.”108 
A party’s use should not affect the owner’s potential market or replace 
its demand.109  In determining harm, not only is the potential harm to the 
original works considered, “but . . . harm to the market for derivative 
works” is considered, as well.110  A concern exists when there is an 
excessively widespread dissemination of derivative works that will cause a 
potential harm to any work’s market.111  Hence, a balance must be struck 
between the benefit gained by the copyright owner when the copying is 
found to be an unfair use and the benefit gained by the public when the use 
is held to be fair.112  If the unauthorized use becomes “widespread,” then a 
copyright owner only needs to demonstrate it would prejudice the potential 
market for his work.113  “Yet where the use is intended for commercial 
gain[,] some meaningful likelihood of future harm is presumed.”114  The 
doctrine of fair use, as a whole, helps to prevent potential market harm.115 
 
specifically examines whether the conduct of copying, if unrestricted and widespread, would 
adversely affect the copyright owner’s potential market). 
106. Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 448 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
107. See id. 
In assessing the economic effect of the parody, the parody’s critical impact must be 
excluded.  Through its critical function, a parody may quite legitimately aim at 
garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically.  Accordingly, 
the economic effect of a parody with which we are concerned is not its potential to 
destroy or diminish the market for the original . . . but rather whether it fulfills the 
demand for the original. Biting criticism suppresses demand; copyright infringement 
usurps it. 
Id. (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotations omitted). 
108. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985); Storm 
Impact Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (relating to factor #4). 
110. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (citing Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 568). 
111. Id. (finding the defendant’s “fair use” defense to copyright infringement was impaired 
because they did not address the potential for their work to harm the market for derivative works 
the plaintiffs had exclusive right to prepare); see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 567; 
Storm Impact Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 788. 
112. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984); MCA, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981); Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 215 
U.S.P.Q. 861, 862 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (concluding the publisher stole the cover of the copyright 
holder’s arcade game; because illustrations on the covers of one of the publisher’s books were 
non-educational and were only meant to lure buyers, they infringed the copyright and the fair use 
exception did not apply). 
113. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 568; Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 451. 
114. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) (ruling in favor of copyright 
infringement because it was determined that the infringer copied the original material for its own 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. DOUBLE OR NOTHING—STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTION OF CASINO 
GAMES AND MACHINES 
After learning about the doctrine of fair use and what it takes to obtain 
protection, one might ask why would a casino even want to make itself 
distinct from every other casino, rather than just be alike?  After all, in the 
world of gaming, “[t]he concept of idea sharing and collaboration is one of 
interest and significance.”116  But one recurring question is whether these 
gaming ideas and concepts should be allowed such protection if so desired 
by the creator/owner of the casino games and machines. 
The option of copyright protection for casinos should be present if 
game creators wish to have it.  Gaming ideas, such as new computer-
controlled gaming devices117 or games like Double Exposure,118 Spanish 
21,119 Three Card Poker,120 Let It Ride,121 and Caribbean Stud,122 are great 
new concepts that can bring in “big money” for casino game creators and 
 
commercial purposes, without paying for it); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 449 (noting 
commercial use is “presumptively” unfair use). 
115. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 450 (noting “the purpose of copyright is to create 
incentives for creative effort”). 
116. Peter DeRaedt, A Message from the President, GAMING STANDARDS ASS’N (Winter 
2004), http://www.gamingstandards.com/newsletter/winter04/presidentsmessage.html. 
117. Anthony N. Cabot & Robert C. Hannum, Gaming Regulation and Mathematics: A 
Marriage of Necessity, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 333, 358 (2002) (discussing different game 
products). 
118. Double Exposure, WIZARD OF ODDS, http://www.wizardofodds.com/games/double-
exposure (last updated Oct. 23, 2009) (providing the rules and strategy to this casino game). 
119. Spanish 21, WIZARD OF ODDS, http://www.wizardofodds.com/games/spanish-21 (last 
updated Aug. 10, 2010) (providing the rules, strategy, house edge, potential bonus, rule variations, 
and methodology to this casino game). 
120. Three-Card Poker, GAMBLING IL DADO, http://www.ildado.com/three_card_poker.html 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (providing the game summary to this casino game); Three Card Poker, 
WIZARD OF ODDS, http://www.wizardofodds.com/games/three-card-poker/ (last updated Feb. 26, 
2011) (providing the rules, ante, analysis, bonus, strategy, and variations to this casino game); 
Three Card Poker–How To Play, ABOUT.COM, http://www.casinogambling.about.com/od 
/othergames/a/3cardpoker.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (providing the rules, ante, strategy, and 
payout to this casino game). 
121. Let It Ride–Analysis and Expert Strategy, WIZARD OF ODDS, http://www. 
wizardofodds.com/games/let-it-ride/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2011) (providing the rules, payout 
warning, strategy, house edge, betting format, and a method to seeing extra cards for this casino 
game); Let It Ride–How To Play, ABOUT.COM, http://www.casinogambling.about.com/od/ 
othergames/a/LIR.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (providing the rule, strategy, and betting 
process to this casino game); Let It Ride Poker, GAMBLING IL DADO, http://www.ildado.com/ 
let_it_ride_poker.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (providing the game summary, house 
advantage, recommended strategy, and betting scheme to this casino game). 
122. Cabot & Hannum, supra note 117, at 358 (discussing card games and computer-
controlled gaming devices located in a casino). 
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casinos.  These twists on blackjack and variations on poker might be worth 
millions of dollars, so a casino game creator might want protection on the 
new, brilliant gambling idea, as would the casino that owns the gambling 
game.  This is where the doctrine of fair use for casino games and machines 
would come into play. 
There is a need for guidelines and examples to follow in order for a 
casino game or machine creator to be allowed stronger protection from the 
fair use defense.  The next sections of this article discuss model guidelines, 
rules, and regulations to mimic as possible options to give casino games and 
machines protection from allegedly “fair use” copying, such as adding a 
component to the fourth factor of the doctrine of fair use.  A few examples 
are cited to show how these guidelines would be helpful in certain 
situations. 
B. PUSH—POSSIBLE GUIDELINES TO PURSUE FOR PROTECTION 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE 
In order to obtain protection from the doctrine of fair use, “use” needs 
to be properly defined for items that can be protected.  For example, rather 
than being “used” in another casino without the original casino’s per-
mission, there should be protection against unwarranted “fair use” of a 
protected slot machine.  At the same time, the owner of the unique casino 
game or machine must be the owner of the copyright, similar to the 
aforementioned factors of the doctrine of fair use.  Currently, casino logos 
are protected, but common casino equipment, such as slot machines, card 
games, and dice games, are not protected. 
“The Lanham Act123 was intended to make ‘actionable the deceptive 
and misleading use of marks’ and ‘to protect persons engaged in . . . 
commerce against unfair competition.’”124  The same can be applied to 
“fake” or “fairly used” games and machines in various casinos that mimic 
or copy the actual unique games and machines from a specific casino.  
Using the intentions of the Lanham Act, casino games and machines will be 
protected to allow for a shield to new and innovative gambling concepts 
that may be created by a casino.  Thus, casinos can potentially receive 
protection for ideas and not worry about another casino making a replica of 
their concept. 
 
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006). 
124. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127). 
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“In order to be registered, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the 
applicant’s goods from those of others.”125  In other words, a mark must be 
“inherently distinctive” or identify a particular source of origin.126  For 
instance, the rule can apply to special games and machines that are 
“inherently distinctive” for that specific casino.  Again, instead of a merely 
protecting a mark, the law can now protect a gambling concept.  In the end, 
the “famous” casino game or machine can then be associated with only the 
casino that created (or owns) the concept. 
Moreover, the issue of whether the similarities in packaging create a 
likelihood of confusion is determined by “the total . . . impression” of the 
packaging, not by whether defendants’ packaging imitates plaintiffs’ 
packaging in every detail.127  Thus, any slight change in the “packaging” of 
new slot machines and card games might not warrant protection for the 
creators of the new gambling amenities according to these rules, or the 
doctrine of fair use.  For this reason, more stringent constraints need to be 
applied to the doctrine of fair use, such as adding a component to the fourth 
fair use factor relating to the effect on the potential market. 
All of these safeguards lead to the ultimate goal of protection against 
public confusion.128  When a patron plays a certain card game or slot 
machine, that person knows it is from a particular casino only.  Public 
perception is important to casinos as is evident by their attempts to look the 
same both inside and out.  However, this universal appearance still does not 
make casinos distinct.  There needs to be protection of new and innovative 
gambling machines and games, so a casino may be able to stand out and 
profit from its original concepts, knowing it is the only casino to have a 
special game or machine.  A patron might chose to go to a certain casino to 
play the original card game or slot machine, and the exclusivity of having 
such can be accomplished through protections, such as a stricter fair use 
factor or rigid laws. 
 
125. Id. at 768 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052). 
126. Id. at 768-69. 
127. See Chesebrough Mfg. Co. v. Old Gold Chem. Co., 70 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1934); Bulk 
Mfg. Co. v. Schoenbach Prods. Co., 208 U.S.P.Q. 664, 668 (S.D.N.Y 1980); 1 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8.1, at 231 (1973). 
128. Cf. Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[B]ecause 
the Lanham Act universally protects against consumer confusion, we see no distinction between 
trademark cases and misleading advertisement cases for the purpose of laches.”). 
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C. INSURANCE—THE FOURTH FAIR USE FACTOR:  EFFECT ON 
POTENTIAL MARKET 
Because there are limits on what can be done under copyright 
infringement for casino games and machines, an additional component for 
the fourth fair use factor relating to market effect needs to be implemented 
to the doctrine of fair use.  The proposed additional component for the 
fourth fair use factor will give the guidance needed to determine what is and 
what is not copyright infringement with regard to casino games and 
machines.  The additional analysis to the fourth fair use factor is meant to 
be broad, rather than exact and precise, in order to encompass a great 
extent. 
1. Additional Component for the Fourth Fair Use  
Factor and Casino Technology 
Infringement of a copyrightable expression, such as a casino game or 
machine image, could be justified as “fair use” based on the alleged 
infringer’s claim to a different use.129  Without insuring public awareness of 
the original work, there would be no practicable boundary to the doctrine of 
fair use.130  Thus, there must be a supplementary component added to the 
fourth fair use factor for slight variations to casino games or machine 
images, such as theme changes to the depicted slot machine. 
As in Blanch v. Koons,131 Rogers v. Koons,132 and Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises, Ltd. Partnership v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,133 reader 
recognition of the defendant’s “different perspective on context” mediates 
any potential conflict between a reader-response view of transformativeness 
and the derivative work right.134  Not giving a casino compensation or 
 
129. Heymann, supra note 78, at 461; see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
130. Heymann, supra note 78, at 461; see Rogers, 960 F.2d at 301. 
131. 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
132. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
133. 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997). 
134. Blanch, 476 F.3d at 257 (describing how defendant was not held liable for copyright 
infringement since the artist’s incorporation of plaintiff photograph in a collage painting 
constituted fair use); Dr. Seuss Enters., Ltd. P’ship, 109 F.3d at 1401 (stating distribution of a 
publication, not owned by the distributing party, is a demonstration copyright infringement); 
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309-10 (describing how sculptor’s use of copyright protected photograph 
constituted copyright infringement due to the commercial benefit and blatant copying that 
occurred); Heymann, supra note 78, at 464; see Laura R. Bradford, Parody and Perception:  
Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705, 764 (2005) (“It 
may be that consumers are perfectly capable of contextualizing reworkings of expressive texts if 
they have sufficient information about the source.”). 
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credit when using its game or machine is a problem that needs to be 
resolved. 
The change must subject one to liability when use of another person’s 
name, likeness, or other indicia of identity is appropriated for commercial 
value without consent.135  Hence, use of an original casino game or machine 
will make the copying casino liable for copyright infringement under the 
additional component to the fourth fair use factor. 
2. A Need for an Additional Component Applied  
to the Fourth Fair Use Factor 
“One cannot transform something one doesn’t adapt or comment 
on.”136  In order to be transformative, the work must use the preexisting 
work for a different purpose from its creator.137  Having a transformative 
work would be hard to accomplish with regard to a casino machine, such as 
a slot machine, when the sole purpose of gambling is for the user. 
A gambling machine in one casino, using the same image from the 
original casino, cannot “serve[] an entirely different function” than the 
indicia associated with the original gambling machine in the original 
casino.138  A gambling machine with indicia in a casino is used for one 
reason:  to obtain monetary gain through the use and fame of original casino 
machine and game indicia.  Thus, a replicated gambling machine (alleged 
infringer) would then have the same function as the original gambling 
machine to gain money.  The proposed additional component to the fourth 
fair use factor would not allow for this copyright infringement of original 
casino games and machines.  Further, indications of the additional compon-
ent would significantly outweigh the “transformative” machine indicia fair 
use protection because it is an added component to the “effect on the 




135. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 458 (6th Cir. 2003); Seale v. Gramercy 
Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 339 (E.D. Penn. 1996); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 46 (1995). 
136. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 12, Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 
448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2514); Williams, supra note 52, at 321. 
137. Williams, supra note 52, at 327 (stating the court cited the Bill Graham Archives 
opinion on this point). 
138. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding such copying 
was transformative because the thumbnail copies of the photographs the search engine produced 
and displayed did not “supersede[] the object” of the original photos in that they “served an 
entirely different function”). 
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3. Expanding upon the Fourth Fair Use Factor 
to Help Protect Casino Games and Gambling  
Machines Needs to Happen 
It is not necessary the indicia of a casino game or gambling machine 
contain a completely different image or appeal itself, so long as the indicia 
are distinguishable enough to make consumer confusion unlikely.139  This 
would never happen when indicia are used in an original casino game or 
machine because the whole point of using the indicia is to entice people and 
get their attention.  The additional component to the fourth fair use factor 
would eliminate this possible flaw in the doctrine of fair use and would not 
allow copyright infringement of original casino technology, such as a game 
or machine.  After all, the “‘Spectrum of Fair Use’ analysis has qualities 
that many might see as fatal flaw: uncertainty, subjectivity, and 
arbitrariness.”140 
There is a copyrightable interest in casino technology, yet use of these 
games and machines cannot be done without consequences.  With consumer 
confusion, for example, the right of publicity protects celebrities from 
possible copyright infringement of their image, so the next step in copyright 
protection must be taken by adjoining an additional component to the fourth 
fair use factor. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
After learning about the different prongs and factors that need to be 
established in order to apply the doctrine of fair use, one thing is clear:  
there are ways to protect new and innovative casino games and machines.  
In particular, there can be protection provided for casinos and their new 
specialty gambling games and machines if rules and regulations are put in 
place, similar to the doctrine of fair use and the Lanham Act.  For instance, 
there must be a doctrine of fair use factor that is helpful to the copyright for 
original casino games and machines.  Casinos should have their new, innov-
ative games protected with rules, just like how a copyright is protected, but 
there should also be a factor set in place within the doctrine of fair use 
specifically which can cater casino games and machines.  If the doctrine of 
fair use and Lanham Act guidelines are followed, then there will be the 
 
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 
1992) (stating a false association claim requires the misuse or other distinguishing device to 
confuse consumers as to the origin, approval, or endorsement of the product); see also Cliffs 
Notes, Inc. v Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989). 
140. Daniel Austin Green, Gulliver’s Trials:  A Modest Proposal to Excuse and Justify 
Satire, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 183, 210 (2007). 
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necessary and adequate protection that is needed for casinos with original 
games and machines. 
A. DOUBLING DOWN—INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL COMPONENT IN 
THE FOURTH FAIR USE FACTOR TO BETTER PROTECT CASINOS 
The proposed added component to the fourth fair use factor deals with 
casino technology protection, mainly games and machines.  This additional 
component for the fourth fair use factor is not designed to conflict or 
challenge any of the statutory considerations.  This component is intended 
merely to provide further guidance on the application of general common 
law principles of excuse and justification141 in conjunction with statutory 
protection for fair use.142  The additional section to the fourth fair use factor 
is meant not to be exact and precise, but rather to be broad in order to 
encompass a great extent.  Adding a supplementary component for the 
fourth fair use factor is another step in the right direction for the history of 
fair use. 
“[T]he true purpose of copyright [is] to benefit the public by getting 
new work.”143  Yet, use of a gambling game or machine from the original 
casino in a different, unauthorized casino does not fulfill that purpose, but 
rather infringes on the copyright.  A secondary casino that contains a 
gambling machine or game from the original casino must contribute 
something more than a mere trivial variation.  In order to qualify for legal 
protection, a secondary casino must create something that is recognizable as 
its own.144  Even if a work is considered transformative and fits within the 
current four fair use factors, it is difficult to say that a re-creation of an 
original casino machine or game indicia is considered one’s own work and 
not the original in general.  With the proposed additional component to the 
fourth fair use factor, even if a recreation of an original casino machine or 
game indicia is considered transformative, the edited fourth fair use factor 
still considers the work of the creator to be copyright infringement because 
 
141. Id. at 193-95. 
142. Id. at 208. 
143. Mark Hamblett, Koons’ “Transformative” Use of Photo Affirmed by 2d Circuit, 
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31, 2006, at 1, 2 (quoting Koons’ lawyer, John B. Koegel); see also Blanch v. 
Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming that Koons did not infringe the copyright 
of Blanch’s photograph because Koons’ incorporation of the photograph in a collage painting 
constituted fair use, pursuant to 1976 Copyright Act); Williams, supra note 52, at 329. 
144. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 480-81 (Cal. 2003) (declaring that when an artist’s 
skill and talent is manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of 
a celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her fame, the artist’s right of free expression is 
outweighed by the right of publicity); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797, 810-11 
(Cal. 2001). 
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re-creation of an original casino machine or game indicia in order to benefit 
one’s work is not fair use and infringes on the copyrighted casino 
technology. 
B. EXAMPLE 
This supplementary analysis to include in the fourth fair use factor will 
protect against unwarranted use of an original casino machine or game 
indicia and concept or function, and not the original casino machine or 
game itself.  For example, original casino machines and games, along with 
their indicia, could include such casino technology as GPMax operating 
system,145 QuikTicket,146 and Lord of the Rings microgaming.147 
The fourth fair use factor needs to be altered in order to protect against 
unlawful use of casino machine or game indicia in casino technology.  The 
additional component to the fourth fair use factor will provide the much-
needed protection from others who try to capitalize on the currently 
defenseless original casino machine or game creator and its casino 
technology.  This section added to the fourth fair use factor will not allow 
others to use casino machines and games for their own personal commercial 
benefit.  Such protection of original casino machines and games is essential. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Suppose one depicted a mechanical robot of a dark-haired, tan-skinned, 
Caucasian male with a stubble beard wearing a leather flight jacket, 
messenger bag, Sam Browne belt,148 waist belt with holster, khaki shirt, and 
trousers having a pistol revolver gun.  What if this mechanical robot even 
 
145. GameTech International, Inc. Announces Montana Gambling Control Approval of New 
Software Suite and Operating System, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.prnewswire. 
com/news-releases/gametech-international-inc-announces-montana-gambling-control-approval-
of-new-software-suite-and-operating-system-100067599.html (discussing the new GTMC 
operating system that will implemented for twenty-one newly designed games in Montana 
casinos). 
146. Global Case Access Gets Gaming Approval in Nevada, CASINO CITY TIMES (July 27, 
2010), http://www.casinocitytimes.com/news/article/global-cash-access-gets-gaming-approval-in-
nevada-194494 (discussing how the newest GCA technology product, by unanimous approval 
from the Nevada Gaming Control Board, will allow casino patrons to have the choice of receiving 
either cash or a slot ticket when conducting an ATM transaction). 
147. Lord of the Rings Coming to Microgaming Powered Online Casinos, CASINO 
GAMBLING WEB (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.casinogamblingweb.com/gambling-news/online-
casino/lord_of_the_rings_coming_to_microgaming_powered_online_casinos_53816.html 
(discussing the partnership between Microgaming and The Lord of the Rings trilogy in order to 
create video slot machines). 
148. A wide belt, usually leather, which is supported by a strap going diagonally over the 
right shoulder. 
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had a whip and wide-brimmed fedora hat?  If this mechanical robot, with 
precise physical attributes and identifications, was then to be used in a 
commercial, can any particular person claim that the mechanical robot is 
using his identity?149  Is it fair to use this “generic robot” to sell products 
without the thought of any repercussions or ramifications?150 
As one can see, an additional component to the fourth fair use factor 
dealing with marketability needs to be implemented immediately.  Adding a 
component to the fourth fair use factor that will protect original casino 
technology, mainly gambling games and machines, from copyright 
infringement will help to advance the doctrine of fair use in the proper 
direction. 
“Gambling has a long history of both prohibition and regulation.”151  
Such regulation is done primarily by the individual states with supporting 
legislation by the federal government.152  So, why not apply this same 
history and regulations to newly created, original casino games and 
machines, too?  This article has not attempted to analyze or refute such an 
argument due to the inherently fact-based determinations that a proper fair 
use analysis requires.  However, the argument should give courts pause . . . 
to think. 
 
149. See INDIANA JONES AND THE KINGDOM OF THE CRYSTAL SKULL (Paramount Pictures 
2008); INDIANA JONES AND THE LAST CRUSADE (Paramount Pictures 1989); INDIANA JONES AND 
THE RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981); INDIANA JONES AND THE TEMPLE OF 
DOOM (Paramount Pictures 1984). 
150. Cf. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (declaring 
the identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but 
also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or voice).  
Suppose one depicted a mechanical robot of a bald, African-American male wearing a baggy 
black uniform with red trim jumping through the air with a basketball in one hand, stiff-armed, 
legs extended open like scissors.  Id.  What if this mechanical robot even had the number twenty-
three on his uniform and had his mechanical tongue hanging out?  Id. 
151. Katherine A. Valasek, Winning the Jackpot:  A Framework for Successful International 
Regulation of Online Gambling and the Value of the Self-Regulating Entities, 2007 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 753, 754 (2007) (providing a historical discussion of the evolution of federal regulation and 
the states’ roles in gambling).  See generally James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S. Gaming 
Regulation, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138 (1998). 
152. Valasek, supra note 151, at 754 (discussing the history of gambling regulation and 
changes made through the decades); see Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private 
Markets:  Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 371, 431-34 (2006). 
